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Abstract—In this work we explore the security of secret keys
generated via the electromagnetic reciprocity of the wireless
fading channel. Identifying a new sophisticated colluding attack,
we explore the information-theoretic-security for such keys in the
presence of an all-powerful adversary constrained only by the
laws of quantum mechanics. Specifically, we calculate the reduc-
tion in the conditional mutual information between transmitter
and receiver that can occur when an adversary with unlimited
computational and communication resources places directional-
antenna interceptors at chosen locations. Such locations, in
principal, can be arbitrarily far from the intended receiver yet
still influence the secret key rate.
The fast generation in real-world communication systems
of an information-theoretic-secure key remains an ongoing
endeavor. Currently, almost all key generation systems being
considered for commercial deployment scenarios are those
based on the quantum mechanical properties of the information
carriers. However, although great progress has been made over
the years with respect to quantum key distribution (QKD)
systems, significant practical challenges remain before their
deployment becomes ubiquitous (see [1] for a recent review).
The technical reasons for such a circumstance are many-fold,
but they do give rise to a search for other sources of shared
randomness that can be exploited for secret key generation.
Transceivers connected via a wireless channel offer up one
possibility - via purely classical means.1
Indeed, for many years it has been known that the random
fading inherent in the general wireless environment (coupled
with electromagnetic reciprocity) is a potential source of secret
key generation (for recent reviews see [4–7]). Conditioned on
the reasonable (and trivial to verify) assumption that Eve (the
adversary) is not in the immediate vicinity (a few cm at GHz
frequencies) of Bob (the legitimate receiver), it is often stated
that fading can lead to information-theoretic-secure keys. Here
we clarify this is not the case when Me →∞, Me being the
number of receiving devices held by Eve.
An all-powerful adversary constrained only by nature her-
self is used in almost all security analyses of QKD systems
[1] - and it is the protection from such an unearthly adversary
that lends quantum-based key systems their acclaimed security
status. Such acclaimed security is information-theoretic-secure
(conditioned on the classical channel being authenticated) and
remains in place irrespective of the computational resources
or energy afforded to the adversary, even as Me →∞.
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1Such a classical route is particularly important since QKD directly over
wireless channels in the GHz range is constrained to short distances [2, 3].
Here, we explore an attack by such an all-powerful Eve on
wireless fading generated key systems. More specifically, we
quantify how this Eve can place directional-antenna receivers
(e.g. apertures, linear-arrays, phased-arrays, etc.) at multiple
locations in real-word scattering environments, and in principal
drive to arbitrary low levels the conditional mutual information
between Bob and Alice (the transmitter). Practical scenarios
invoking limited forms of the attack are discussed, showing
(at the very least) how current fading-generated key systems
are partially susceptible to the attack.
We will take the term ‘information-theoretic-secure’ to
specifically mean the following. Conditioned on some well-
defined assumption (or restriction) on the system model,
but independent of the capabilities of an adversary (other
than being constrained by natural law), the key information
accessible to an adversary can be driven to arbitrary small
levels for increasing use of some system resource. Specifically,
consider some series of observations of the random variables
X = (X1, X2, . . . Xn,), Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . Yn,), and Z =
(Z1, Z2, . . . Zn,) of a shared random resource by Alice, Bob
and Eve, respectively. We assume a scheme with unlimited
message exchanges between Alice and Bob (available to Eve)
whereby for some sufficiently large n, keys computed by Alice
and Bob (KA and KB, respectively) are made to satisfy the
following requirements for some ǫ > 0, (i) Pr (KA 6= KB) ≤
ε, (ii) n−1I (KA; Z) ≤ ε, (iii) n−1I (KA) ≥ rK − ε, and
(iv) n−1 log |C| ≤ n−1H(KA) + ε, where H (·) is the en-
tropy, I (·;·) is the mutual information between two random
variables, I (·; ·| ·) is the mutual information between two
random variables conditioned on another random variable, |C|
is the cardinality of the key’s alphabet (C), and rK is an
achievable secret key rate of the scheme. In general, the secret
key rate is not known, but an upper limit can be given by
[8, 9] rK ≤ min (I (X ;Y ) , I (X ; Y |Z)), where the mutual
information betweenX and Y conditioned on Z can be written
I (X ; Y |Z) = H(X,Z) + H(Y, Z) − H(Z) − H(X,Y, Z),
where H (·, ·, . . .) is the joint entropy of a sequence of
random variables.2 If we introduce the Kullback-Leibler in-
formation divergence between two probability mass functions
p(w) and q(w) with sample space W , viz., D (p‖ q) =∑
w∈W
p(w) log p(w)
q(w) = E
[
− log q(w)
p(w)
]
then the conditional mu-
tual information can be estimated via a discrete formulation,
viz., I (X ; Y |Z) = D
(
p(x, y, z)‖ p(x,z)p(y,z)
p(z)
)
, p(x) being
the probability X = x, and p (·, ·, . . .) the corresponding joint
probability.
2Here, I(X; Y |Z) ≤ I(X; Y ) for all our calculations.
2Fig. 1. Probability density functions (pdf) for different path settings. The
inset graph shows the pdf at Bob for an infinite number of paths (dashed),
6 paths (dot-dashed), and a colluding Eve who has perfectly intercepted (see
text) 5 paths (solid). The sketch on left illustrates the nature of the colluding
attack where the solid (black) lines indicate some of the potentially many
rays towards Bob that Eve intercepts, and the (red) dashed line indicates one
of the potentially many ‘interference’ paths to a directional antenna held by
Eve.
We adopt the narrow-band flat-fading channel, and take
the far-field approximation with wave propagation confined
to a plane geometry. We assume the electric field vector
is orthogonal to the plane and that isotropic gain antennas
are held by Alice and Bob. If we consider, at the carrier
frequency fc (wavelength λc), a bandpass transmitted signal
s(t) = Re
{
s˜(t)ej2pifct
}
, where s˜(t) is the complex envelope,
the received bandpass signal can then be written (e.g. [10]),
r(t) = Re
{
N∑
n=1
Cne
j2pi([fc+fDn ][t−τn])s˜(t− τn)
}
. Here N is
the number of propagation paths reaching the receiver, Cn and
τn are the amplitude and time delay, respectively, and f
D
n is the
Doppler frequency (n indicates the nth path). This latter quan-
tity can be expressed as fDn = (v/λc) cosαn, v being the ve-
locity of the receiver and αn being the angle of arrival (AoA)
of the nth path at the receiver, relative to the velocity vector.
Similar to the transmit signal, a complex envelope for the re-
ceived signal can be written, r˜(t) =
N∑
n=1
Cne
−jϕn(t)s˜(t− τn),
where ϕn(t) = 2π
([
fc + f
D
n
]
τn − fDn t
)
. Therefore, we
have r(t) = Re
{
r˜(t)ej2pifct
}
. In the case of a transmitted
single tone this can be written as r(t) = rI(t) cos 2πfct −
rQ(t) sin 2πfct, where rI(t) =
N∑
n=1
Cn(t) cosϕn(t) and
rQ(t) =
N∑
n=1
Cn(t) sinϕn(t). In the Rayleigh channel these
quadratures are independent Gaussian processes. Writing
|A| =
√
rI(t)
2
+ rQ(t)
2
and ϑ = arctan (rQ(t)/rI(t)) we
then have r(t) = |A| cos (2πfct+ ϑ), where |A| is Rayleigh
distributed and ϑ is uniformly distributed. In such a channel,
|A| and/or ϑ can be used for secret key construction.
Ultimately the secret key is dependent on movement in the
scattering environment, and it this movement that sets the
channel coherence time (and therefore the key rate). The move-
ment within the scattering environment ultimately manifests
itself at the receiver through variation in received amplitudes
and delays. However, to enable clarity of exposition, we will
make some simplifications to our scattering model - noting
that the attack we describe can in fact be applied to any
scattering environment scenario. The simplifications are that
we assume equal amplitudes for all received signals, and
adopt random uniform distributions for all AoA and all phases
as measured by the receiver. This is in fact the celebrated
2D isotropic scattering model of Clarke [11]. Moving to
the baseband signal henceforth for convenience, we note in
Clarke’s model the signal of a transmitted symbol can be
written as g(t) = 1√
N
N∑
n=1
exp (j (wdt cosαn + φn)), where
wd is now the maximum Doppler frequency in rad/s, and φn
is the phase of each path. Assuming both αn and φn are
independent and uniformly distributed in [−π, π), then in the
limit of large N the amplitude of the signal g(t) is distributed
as a Rayleigh distribution.
Of particular interest to us here will be the statistics of g(t)
at low values of N , since in such circumstances the potential
for an adversary to intercept all signals is larger. The higher
order statistics of the distribution within Clarke’s model at
finiteN have been explored in [12], showing that the following
autocorrelation functions are in place; Υgg (τ) = J0 (ωdτ ),
and Υ|g|2|g|2 (τ) = 1 + J
2
0 (ωdτ) − J
2
0
(ωdτ)
N
, where J0 (·) is
the zero-order Bessel function of the first kind. For large N
these functions approach those of the Rayleigh distribution.
Importantly, the Υ|g|2|g|2 function is well approximated by an
exponentiated sinc function at values of N ≥ 6, meaning that
(as per the usual assumption for any fading generated key),
Eve must be several wavelengths away from Bob for the secret
key rate to be non-zero.3
Many refinements on Clarke’s model exist with perhaps the
most widely used being that of [12] in which the main differ-
entiator is a constraint placed on the AoA, viz., αn =
2pin+θn
N
,
where θn is independently (relative to φn) and uniformly
distributed in [−π, π). This latter simulator is wide sense
stationary, is more efficient, and has improved second-order
statistics. In consideration of all statistical measures, it is noted
that for this refined model any differences between N & 8 and
the N = ∞ model (pure Rayleigh distribution) are largely
inconsequential [12].4
In real-world channels, therefore, we have to be aware that
even in cases where the channel appears to be consistent
with a Rayleigh channel, the number of propagation paths
contributing to the received signal can be relatively small. This
can be seen more clearly from Fig. (1) where the probability
density functions formed from six and five propagation paths
3A relaxation of this requirement may be obtained in specific correlated
channel scenarios applicable to a distance of order 10 wavelengths (∼ meters
at GHz frequencies) away from the receiver [13]. The attack we describe here
is unrelated to the special case of correlated channels. It is a general attack.
Eve’s receivers can in principal be positioned anywhere (e.g. kms away from
the intended receiver) yet still mount a successful attack.
4In the calculations to follow, we find that the key rates computed are, in
effect, independent of whether this refined model or Clarke’s original model
is the adopted Rayleigh simulator.
3are shown in comparison to the infinite path limit. The five
path model corresponds to a case where Eve is missing one
of the propagation paths used to construct Bob’s signal. For
the cases shown the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
Rayleigh distribution and the lower-path models is very small.
Let us assume the communications obtained by Bob consist
of the combined signals from N last-scattering events. We
are interested in determining the effect, on some secret key
generation scheme, caused by Eve’s interception of all (or
some fraction of) the N last-scattered paths received by Bob.
We assume Eve has Me >> N directional-antenna receivers,
and has placed them at multiple locations with the aim
of continuously intercepting all of the last-scattered signals
towards Bob with high probability.5 We assume that these
locations are much greater than λc from Bob.
Beyond our assumption of 2D geometry, and that the
amplitude of each last-scattered ray entering any receiver is
equal, we also assume that the number of paths reaching
each of Eve’s antennas is equal to N .6 Extension of our
analysis to cover these issues is cumbersome, but straight-
forward. To make our mathematical notation less unwieldy,
we will artificially set Me = N in our equations, with the
understanding that we are then simply ignoring all of Eve’s
devices which (at any given time) are not intercepting any
scattered rays towards Bob. For added focus, we will assume
Eve uses circular apertures of diameter d as her directional
receivers - the physics and properties of which can be found
elsewhere, e.g. [14]. Eve configures her nth aperture at each
location so as to maximize signal gain for the signal directed
by the last scatterer in the direction of Bob (i.e. the nth of N
rays reaching Bob is centered in the main lobe of Eve’s nth
aperture). In such circumstances the signal collected by Eve’s
nth receiver can be approximated as,
gnc (t) =
1√
N


exp (j (wedt+ φ
e
n))+
N∑
k=2

 exp (j (w
e
dt cosα
e
k + φ
e
k))×
2λcJ1(pidλc sin(β
e
k
))
pid sin(βek)




where the superscript e applied to any previously used variable
means it is now applied to Eve (but same meaning), where βek
represents the angle between the kth propagation path (side
lobe ‘interference’ path) arriving at Eve’s detector and ray n
(i.e. βen = 0), and where J1 (·) is the Bessel function of the
first kind of order one. Note that the maximum Doppler shift
wed on Eve’s detector is included so as to cover the general
case. However, for focus we will assume all of Eve’s detectors
are stationary, and in the following always set wed = 0.
To reduce the mathematical complexity further we have not
5Such a possibility can be enhanced in some scenarios by additional actions
on Eve’s part. For example, a scenario in which Eve has conducted an a
priori ray-tracing measurement (or analysis) campaign between a given pair
of transmit and receive locations thereby obtaining probabilistic information
on likely last scattering points (for that given pair of locations). Of course in
the limit ME →∞ her probability of intercepting all paths approaches one
in any case.
6As an aside, we find a doubling of this number of paths at each of Eve’s
detectors has negligible impact on the results. Also note, as the number of
paths reaching Eve approach infinity, the size of her aperture must be made
to approach infinity for the attack to remain viable. Neither limits are ever in
place of course.
included in our analysis an obliquity factor (1 + cosβek) /2,
which makes our calculations conservative (i.e. results in
higher key rates).
Upon receipt of the signals gnc (t) Eve will adjust the
signals for the known distance offset between each detector
and Bob, and the known motion of Bob. This entails a
phase adjustment at each detector which manifests itself as an
‘adjusting’ phase φna . The combined adjusted signal obtained
by Eve after such signal processing, can then be written as
g(t) =
N∑
n=1
gnc (t) exp(jφ
n
a
).
Assuming Eve’s different apertures intercept all paths that
are received by Bob, the above relations lead us to conclude
that, in principle, by increasing her aperture size Eve can de-
termine Bob’s received signal to arbitrary accuracy. In practice
this accuracy will be limited by any receiver noise on Eve’s
antennas, and error due to imprecise location information
on Bob. However, with regard to these accuracy limitations
(which we include in our Monte Carlo simulations below),
we note the following two points that favor Eve. (i) Given her
all-powerful status, Eve can set her noise to be at the quantum-
limit (quantum noise). (ii) Beyond any other means available
to her, an unlimited Eve can determine the location of Bob
at time t to any required accuracy through signal acquisition.
More specifically in regard to (ii), the minimum position error
via signal processing varies as 1/
√
Me - a result that holds
even if some of Eve’s devices are affected by shadowing in
which the path-loss exponents are unknown [15].
To make further progress we must introduce an actual
scheme for generating a secret key. Although there are many
such schemes (e.g. [4–7]) we will adopt here a generic formu-
lation that covers the conceptual framework of the widely used
signal threshold schemes. The basic concept of such schemes
is to quantize a received signal metric, say amplitude, into
a 1 or 0 value. For some parameter T > 0, and for some
median value m of the expected amplitude distribution, the
decision value can then be set dependent on whether the
amplitude is below m − T or above m + T . Such schemes
offer many pragmatic advantages and compensate to a large
extent errors introduced through a lack of exact reciprocity
between transceiver configurations. Assuming a given level
of Gaussian noise at Bob and Eve’s receivers, an appropriate
value of T can be chosen. Further, so as to maximize the
entropy of the final key, we introduce an ‘entropy’ factor s.
For a given T and probability density function R′(r) for the
received amplitude r, the value of s can be determined through∫m−T
0 R
′(r)dr =
∫∞
m+T+sR
′(r)dr. Note, in general R′ is the
distribution for the amplitudes in the presence of non-zero
Gaussian receiver noise. When r is measured by Alice and/or
Bob to be between the two ‘allowed’ regions, as defined by
the integrals of this relation, it is agreed by both parties that
the measurement be dropped.
Clearly, in practice larger values of T will minimize mis-
matches in the key at the cost of a reduced key generation
rate. Ultimately, in any real scheme a period of reconciliation
and privacy amplification will be pursued in order to obtain
the final key. However, here we will simply investigate the
upper limit of the key rate through a numerical evaluation
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Fig. 2. Change in the conditional mutual information between Alice and
Bob as function of the diameter of Eve’s directional antenna (a circular
aperture) for different path conditions. Six paths (top figure) and 20 paths
(middle figure) are used to construct the approximate Rayleigh distribution.
One calculation (bottom figure) on the 20 path scenario assumes zero receiver
noise at Eve and zero location error on Bob. Results shown are for 1 million
Monte Carlo runs.
of the conditional mutual information as defined earlier. We
assume Eve’s strategy on detection is to decide on the binary
number in the ‘disallowed’ region by setting s = T = 0. We
also assume all issues on the decision strategy of the scheme
and all communications between Alice and Bob (e.g. which
measurements to drop) are available to Eve.
Fig. (2) (top) displays a calculation of the conditional
mutual information as a function of aperture diameter (all
of Eve’s circular apertures are assumed to be the same size)
in which a receiver noise contribution (on all receivers) is
set so that the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is equal to 17dB.
The maximum Doppler shift of Bob is set to 10Hz, λc is
set to 0.1m, and a Gaussian error on the pointing of Eve’s
apertures (due to location error on Bob) is set to a standard
deviation of 0.002 radians. The threshold is set at three
times the receiver noise. We can see that if all signals are
intercepted the key rate can be driven to almost zero over
the range of aperture diameters probed. For fewer signals
intercepted we see that useful key rates are still possible,
albeit at significantly diminished values relative to a no-attack
scenario. For comparison, Fig. (2) (middle) displays similar
calculations but for 20 propagation paths forming the Rayleigh
distribution, and Fig. (2) (bottom) shows the same calculation
when Eve’s detectors are operating with zero receiver noise,
and location errors on Bob are assumed to be zero.
The specific key scheme discussed here is limited in
scope relative to the large number of possible key generation
schemes available. More sophisticated schemes, such as those
based on multi-antenna transceiver configurations, the use
of optimal coding techniques, and the use of channel state
information, are possible. However, straightforward extensions
of the attack described here would still apply to all of these
more sophisticated schemes - only the quantitative details
on how the key rate is diminished under the attack will be
different.
Indeed, we note the attack described here can be generalized
further so as to always drive the secret key rate to zero, even if
we relax the assumption that it is only the last-scattering rays
that are intercepted. An all-powerful Eve, with ME →∞, can
intercept all propagation paths (of any energy) at all points in
space, and in principal possess knowledge on all characteristics
of all scatterers. With the unlimited computational resources
afforded to her the classical Maxwell equations can then be
solved exactly, thereby providing information on any of Bob’s
received signals at an accuracy limited only by quantum me-
chanical effects. Of course, such an attack whilst theoretically
possible, is not tenable. The calculations described here can
be considered a limited form of such an attack, tenable in a
real-world scattering environment.
In conclusion, we have described a new attack on classical
schemes used to generate secret keys via the shared random-
ness inherent in wireless fading channels. Although the attack
we have described will be difficult to implement in a manner
that drives the secret key rate to zero, our work does illustrate
how such a rate can at least be partially reduced. As such,
all schemes for secret key generation via the fading channel
must invoke a new restriction - a limitation on the combined
information received by a colluding Eve.
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